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Abstract
We investigate if, and under which conditions, the distinction between
dictatorial and incentive-based policy interventions, aﬀects the capacity of
Instrument Variable (IV) methods to estimate the relevant treatment ef-
fect parameter of an outcome equation. The analysis is set in a non-trivial
framework, in which the right-hand side variable of interest is aﬀected by se-
lectivity, and the error term is driven by a sequence of unobserved life-cycle
endogenous choices. We show that, for a wide class of outcome equations,
incentive-based policies may be designed so to generate a suﬃcient degree of
post-intervention randomization (a lesser degree of selection on individual en-
dowments among the sub-population aﬀected). This helps the instrument to
fulﬁll the orthogonality condition. However, for a same class of outcome equa-
tion, dictatorial policies that enforce minimum consumption cannot meet this
condition. We illustrate these concepts within a calibrated dynamic life cy-
cle model of human capital accumulation, and focus on the estimation of the
returns to schooling using instruments generated from mandatory schooling
reforms and education subsidies. We show how the nature of the skill accumu-
lation process (substitutability vs complementarity) may play a fundamental
role in interpreting IV estimates of the returns to schooling.
Key Words: Returns to schooling, Instrumental Variable methods, Dy-
namic Discrete Choice, Dynamic Programming, Local Average Treatment Ef-
fects .
JEL Classification: B4, C1, C3.
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1 Introductory Remarks
Consider the following econometric problem. A researcher seeks to estimate
an outcome equation using Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques. To do so,
he/she maintains the hypothesis that the equation contains only one right-
hand side endogenous variable, and an error term. However, the error term is
generated by a sequence of unobservable (latent) choices, which are exercised
after the realization of the endogenous variable. Suppose that the econome-
trician has to choose between one instrument generated by a dictatorial policy
intervention, and another one generated by an incentive-based policy reform.
The dictatorial policy enforces a minimum consumption/investment level of
the endogenous right-hand side variable, while the incentive policy imple-
ments a subsidy conditional on achieving a certain consumption/investment
level.1
This paper addresses the following questions. Is the nature of the in-
tervention relevant in assessing the capacity for IV to recover the relevant
treatment eﬀect parameter? If so, which type of intervention is more likely
to fulﬁll the identifying orthogonality condition? Is the underlying data gen-
erating process (whether the mis-speciﬁcation is caused by a sequence of
neglected static discrete choices, or a sequence of neglected dynamic discrete
choices) relevant? If so, for which class of outcome equation structure is the
distinction relevant?
Although the diﬀerences between dictatorial and an incentive-based pol-
icy interventions will be made more explicit later, at this stage it is suﬃcient
to recognize that a subsidy may be characterized by three elements; the per-
period subsidy, the starting period of the subsidy (the minimal consump-
tion/investment level upon which payment is conditioned), and the duration
(number of periods over which it is paid). A typical dictatorial intervention
does not oﬀer as much design ﬂexibility. We illustrate these concepts within
a calibrated dynamic life cycle model of human capital accumulation, and
focus on the estimation of the returns to schooling using two popular types of
interventions; namely a mandatory schooling reform, and a set of education
subsidies.
In the ﬁrst portion of the paper, we present an economic analysis of the
1Throughout the paper, we restrict ourself to the case where the econometrician esti-
mates only one treatment eﬀect, and disregards the option of estimating treatment eﬀects
associated to residual choices.
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eﬀects of dictatorial and incentive-based policy interventions. As a second
step, and using simulated data on wages, schooling and policy exposure,
we implement an IV estimation strategy of the returns to schooling, and
stress the relative performance of instruments generated by various education
subsidies as opposed to compulsory schooling regulations.
The main contribution of this paper is methodological. To our knowl-
edge, this is the ﬁrst paper that considers the distinction between dictatorial
and incentive-based interventions within a stochastic dynamic programming
framework, and that translates the distinction into formal economic concepts.
Although econometricians have stressed the fact that diﬀerent instru-
ments may generate diﬀerent population treatment eﬀects, discussions about
IV remain based on explicit identifying orthogonality conditions.2 Our pa-
per is also the ﬁrst that examines the implications of the economic nature
of a policy intervention, for IV estimation. To do so, we introduce the no-
tion of “Post-Intervention Randomization” (PIR), and deﬁne it as the degree
of selection on individual endowments among the sub-population aﬀected).
Throughout the paper, we stress its importance for IV estimation.
Until now, the literature on the economics of IV estimation has concen-
trated mostly on three issues. First, there is a substantial literature that
debates the relevance of estimating Local Average Treatment eﬀects.3 Sec-
ond, some recent papers have debated the distinction between internal and
external validity, in relation with the concept of randomization.4 Thirdly,
many economists have concentrated on the role that economic models may
play in interpreting orthogonality conditions.5
2In the treatment eﬀect literature, it is customary to consider outcome equations that
are multiplicative in the error term. In such a case, it is widely recognized that diﬀerent
experiments generate diﬀerent Local Average Treatment Eﬀects (LATE). The LATE pa-
rameter is deﬁned in Imbens and Angrist (1994) in an IV context. Bjo¨rklund and Moﬃtt
(1987) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) introduced the notion of marginal treatment
eﬀect, which generalizes the LATE parameter. Finally, Belzil and Hansen (2007) estimate
LATE parameters within a stochastic dynamic programming model.
3See Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2005) and Imbens (2009) for opposite views about
the relevance of the LATE parameter.
4The distinction between internal and external validity is discussed in Todd and Wolpin
(2005). Deaton (2008) and Imbens (2009) present opposite views on the desirability of
ex-ante randomization.
5See Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), and Keane (2007), who argue that orthogonality
conditions usually hide a large number of implicit assumptions. Belzil (2007) discusses
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The absence of discussion of the economic nature of various policy inter-
ventions is exempliﬁed in the returns to schooling literature. Compulsory
schooling reforms are systematically used to estimate returns to schooling,
while incentive-based education policies are much less popular.6 Interest-
ingly, both types of policy interventions are treated symmetrically. Their
relative capacities to achieve identifying orthogonality conditions have nei-
ther been investigated, nor questioned. This is understandable. Because
policy reforms (and natural experiments) are scarce, incentive and dictato-
rial policy interventions are never administered on a same data generating
process, and as a consequence, the econometrician practically never gets to
choose between those two types of intervention. So, our analysis therefore
sheds light on the vast empirical literature devoted to returns to schooling.
The main results are as follows. For a wide class of models (including sta-
tic and some dynamic speciﬁcations of the outcome equation), and because
of its relative ﬂexibility in policy design, an incentive-based intervention may
be capable of generating a small degree of selection on individual endow-
ments among the sub-population aﬀected. Dictatorial policies that enforce
minimum consumption (unless set at unrealistically high levels approaching
the maximum consumption level) cannot fulﬁll this condition. This feature
translates into a much higher capacity of incentive-based policies to gener-
ate an instrument that fulﬁlls the identifying orthogonality condition, and
that enables the econometrician to estimate a particular treatment eﬀect. In
the returns to schooling example, our ﬁndings apply both (i) when schooling
has no causal impact on post-schooling choices after conditioning on hetero-
geneity (a static outcome equation), as well as when (ii) schooling stimulates
post-schooling skill accumulation (a dynamic skill complementarity model).
However, when schooling counterbalances the eﬀect of heterogeneity (a form
of dynamic skill-substitutability model), nothing can be said.
Within the particular model structure that we investigate, IV estimates
obtained from compulsory schooling regulations lie well outside the support
of the distribution of the returns to schooling (in the negative orthant), and
are signiﬁcantly far from the population treatment eﬀect. At the same time,
a properly designed education subsidy paid conditional on reaching the in-
similar issues in the sole context of the returns to schooling literature.
6See Card (1999), for a survey of IV literature on the returns to schooling. For a survey
of some incentive-based education policy interventions, see Nielsen, Sorensen and Taber
(2009).
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termediate schooling level, translates into an IV estimate falling within an
arbitrarily small distance of the relevant population treatment eﬀect para-
meter. However, this is not true for all education subsidies. For instance,
a lower-education subsidy generates an instrument that performs almost as
badly as a compulsory schooling instrument.
The residual parts of the paper are organized as follows. In Section 2,
we present some important deﬁnitions, as well as some background material.
In Section 3, we lay-out the behavioral model. The 4th section is devoted to
the calibration exercise. In the 5th section, we illustrate the fundamentals of
the model by summarizing choices and outcomes of the control group. The
economic analysis of each policy intervention is found in Section 6. In Section
7, we introduce the notion of post-intervention randomization, and discuss its
implications for IV estimation in Section 8. In Section 9, we proceed with IV
estimation and discuss the main results. Section 10 is devoted to an intuitive
discussion. Finally, in the last section, we discuss the implications of our
analysis for empirical work, and identify other areas of micro-econometrics
where a similar analysis is likely to be relevant.
2 Background Material
The set of policy interventions used in various ﬁelds of economics is large, but
it is informative to consider two distinct classes; those that are dictatorial in
nature, and those that are based on incentive provisions.
A dictatorial intervention aﬀects individual decisions by restricting the
choice set. In this paper, we focus on policy interventions that impose a
minimum consumption/investment level. In terms of an underlying economic
model, the dictatorial intervention prevents some individuals (those who are
aﬀected) to act on the basis of both their comparative advantages and the
realized idiosyncratic random shocks (ex-ante risk), over a period determined
by the intervention itself.
An incentive policy intervention works diﬀerently. It oﬀers a monetary
incentive (or a disincentive) conditional on consuming a pre-determined level
of a choice variable. In a sequential framework (when consumption takes
time), the incentive policy intervention is characterized by at least three di-
mensions; the per-period subsidy, the starting period of the subsidy (the
minimal consumption/investment level upon which payment is conditioned),
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and the duration (number of periods over which it is paid). The incentive
policy intervention is typically available to all individuals. Before reaching
the relevant consumption/investment level, the eﬀect of the intervention is
perceived through an option value. The actual claim of the incentive payment
therefore depends on individual skill heterogeneity, on the rate of time pref-
erence (or its distribution), on realized random shocks, and on the amount
of the subsidy itself.
At the outset, it should be clear that it is possible to assign all policy ex-
periments to a single class of incentive interventions if, for instance, we allow
the cost (subsidy) of choosing a particular option to approach plus (or minus)
inﬁnity. Also, nothing prevents the existence of hybrid policy interventions,
which would be characterized by both some dictatorial aspects, and some
incentive-based provisions.7 Finally, it is also possible to imagine dictatorial
policies that may be bypassed at some cost. However, we believe that the
dichotomy between dictatorial and incentive-based policies is nevertheless
highly relevant at an empirical level.
The use of IV methods is based on the assumption that the degree of (pre-
intervention) randomization oﬀered by a speciﬁc experiment is suﬃcient to
uncover a parameter of interest.8 In a context where the error term rep-
resents time invariant heterogeneity unobserved to the econometrician (but
exogenous from the perspective of the agent), IV methods are particularly
appealing, and the economic nature of the intervention has no eﬀect on the
accuracy of IV. This is true even if the nature of the intervention has an
impact on the treatment eﬀect parameter that may be estimated.
However, in an intertemporal (sequential) framework, where the error
term of the outcome equation of interest may incorporate subsequent unob-
served choices taking place beyond policy implementation, pre-intervention
randomization is not suﬃcient to uncover quantities of interest. This may
arise in a context where individuals continue to optimize on the basis of time
7In theory, natural experiments (such as disasters and the like) may also be represented
as policy interventions that are (i) either aﬀecting some key economic parameters, or (ii)
restricting individual choice sets. As do policy interventions, natural experiments may
also have hybrid components.
8This statement is, to some extent, contentious since many applied econometricians
apply IV without appealing (explicitly) to orthogonality conditions. In such a case, they
deﬁne the ratio of the correlations that deﬁne IV, as a population parameter of interest
(treat the estimator as the estimand), and interpret it as a (weighted) policy eﬀect.
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invariant heterogeneity. It may also arise when subsequent choices are driven
by heterogeneity, as well as past choices.
The ﬁrst case implies that the error term of the outcome equation is a
function of a sequence of static discrete choices. Individuals move across
states regardless of past choices, and the correlation between current and
subsequent choices is totally spurious. The second case delivers a life-cycle
dynamic discrete choice framework, in which individual subsequent choices
are correlated with previous choices, even after conditioning on tastes and
skills.9
Because IV methods are typically implemented on observational data,
it is unrealistic to rule out potential mis-speciﬁcation of these sorts. This
argument would be particularly true in the returns to schooling literature,
since human capital investments, are by deﬁnition, unobservable.
This raises a fundamental issue. If dictatorial and incentive interventions
reserve a diﬀerent role to comparative advantages (and random shocks) in
determining the composition of the sub-population aﬀected by it, the type of
intervention that systematically aﬀects a more selective sub-population, may
also as a by-product, generate more diﬀerences between subsequent choices
of those aﬀected by the intervention and subsequent choices of those unaf-
fected. If so, the intervention that aﬀects a more selective group is less likely
to generate the realization of the identifying orthogonality conditions. Given
this premise, it is natural to investigate the relative performances of instru-
ments generated by dictatorial policy interventions, and those generated by
incentive-based provisions.
To do so, we cast our analysis within a life-cycle skill accumulation (po-
tentially dynamic) model, and our analysis focuses on the implications of
using either a dictatorial or an incentive-based policy intervention in order
to obtain point estimates of the return to schooling.10 Because educational
9The reader should note that we use the term “static” and “dynamic” to qualify the
nature of the outcome equation. As is going to be clear later, the models that we calibrate
are all based on the assumption that agents are “forward looking”. However, the issues
that we analyze in this paper would still be relevant even if agents were myopic.
10The choice of a dynamic skill accumulation model is only instrumental. Simi-
lar argumentation could be built on non-competitive labor market structures such as
search/matching models (Adda, Dustman, Meghir and Robin, 2005), or dynamic incen-
tive models of promotion and wages. However, the interest in dynamic skill accumulation
models, which dates back to Ben-Porath (1967), has been revived by Keane and Wolpin
(1997) and Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998). It also plays a key role in the recent
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interventions (just like other natural or social experiments) are scarce, it
is impossible to rely on observational data in order to comprehend the dif-
ferences between IV estimates obtained from diﬀerent policy interventions
applied to a same population. Instead, we rely on a mixture of calibration
and more standard IV econometric techniques. Although our results are il-
lustrated within a relatively precise economic framework, we will show that
some of our conclusions may easily be extended to other economic models.
The choice of a life-cycle accumulation theoretical background is not in-
nocuous. The return to schooling is one of the most frequently investigated
parameters in modern economics, and the majority of estimates reported in
the empirical literature are obtained in an IV framework. Our analysis is
centered on an artiﬁcial population of forward looking heterogeneous agents
making decisions between schooling, work, human capital accumulation, and
household production activities. The behavioral model is calibrated to a set
of well recognized stylized facts (or common conjectures) about life cycle
human capital accumulation, and is presented in the next section.
3 The Behavioral Model
Our desire is to generate population moments that may characterize ob-
servational data on schooling, work, training, household production and
earnings.11 To do this, we select a certain number of population charac-
teristics. Most of them are usually regarded as stylized facts.
In total, we selected the following 7 attributes:
1. Schooling should account, on average, for approximately one sixth of
the total time horizon.
2. The incidence of the intensive human capital accumulation state (work
with formal training) must be declining with age.
3. OLS regressions of simulated wages on accumulated experience (poten-
tial) should disclose a declining return (a concave wage proﬁle).
literature on child development (Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010).
11For instance, the artiﬁcal panel data that we generate could resemble the NLSY (one
of the most popular data sets used in the structural literature on human capital).
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4. Labor Market employment (either the sum of full-time work and work
with training) must be the most common choice over the life cycle
5. Household production must be a relatively rare event
6. OLS regressions of simulated wages on education should produce a
higher return than the average in the population.
7. There must be a positive correlation between schooling, and individual
returns to schooling
The ﬁrst characteristic would apply to most advanced countries (such as
the US, Canada and Europe). The second characteristic is also observed in
most countries, and arises in any ﬁnite horizon model (Ben-Porath, 1967).
The third characteristic is an indirect implication of the declining incidence
of productive investment.
The fourth and ﬁfth are particularly relevant for a population of males.
The sixth may be somewhat more controversial. It is sometimes referred
to as the classical “ability bias” hypothesis. It implies that the correlation
between wages and schooling is an over-estimate of the true eﬀect of schooling
on productivity. This is not a stylized fact. Indeed, it is a pure conjecture.
We choose a positive (as opposed to a negative) bias because of its intuitive
aspect. It would obviously be possible to deﬁne the model structure diﬀer-
ently, or to modify the dynamic structure, so to imply a negative OLS bias.
However, this would have no implication for our analysis.12
Finally, the seventh condition ensures that there is positive selection. In
other words, those who are endowed with more academic skills also tend to
be (on average) more educated. This condition guarantees that the econo-
metrician faces a non-trivial statistical problem. Without it, the outcome
equation would be a classical random coeﬃcient regression where the slopes
(the individual returns to schooling) are orthogonal to the regressor (school-
ing).
12There may be other features of life cycle wages that may be occasionnally cited, but as
pointed out recently in Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) and Belzil (2010, forthcoming),
many widely accepted features of the standard Mincer wage equations are rejected when
tested formally.
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3.1 Model Structure
The baseline model is a stochastic dynamic discrete choice model of labor
supply/human capital accumulation over the life-cycle. There are 33 periods
to allocate between the 4 mutually exclusive states. The states are the fol-
lowing; schooling (S), work with a low rate of skill accumulation (E), work
with a high rate of skill accumulation (A), and Household Production (H).
The corresponding variables (St, Et, At,Ht) are used to measure the number
of periods accumulated in each state. There is a maximum of 12 years of
schooling attainable. In observational data, the pendant of state E could be
full time employment with learning by doing, while state (A) could represent
work, with on-the-job training. The distinction between Full-time employ-
ment (E) and Work and Training (A) is therefore in the intensity of human
capital accumulation (A is the high intensity mode). We assume that the
utility of school changes with grade level and we consider 3 distinct levels; 1
to 4, 5 to 8, and 9 to 12. Throughout the analysis, we refer to the ﬁrst level
as Basic Schooling, the second level (5 to 8) as the intermediate level, and
the third one as Higher Education.
Individuals are risk neutral and maximize the expected value of lifetime
net earnings, over the entire life-cycle. The state-speciﬁc utilities are deﬁned
below.
3.2 School
The utility of individual i, at time t, who attends school (state s), denoted
U sit, is
Usit = α
s
i − α
s
1 · I(St ≥ 5))− α
s
2 · I(9 ≤ St)) − α
s
3 · (t− St) + ε
S
it (1)
where I(.) is the indicator function. The parameters αs1,and α
s
2 capture the
higher direct costs of schooling faced by those who enrol in college. These
parameters reﬂect tuition costs and the like. The parameter αS3 captures the
psychic cost of attending school for those who would have interrupted their
education (the length of interruption is t − S(t)). The term αSi represents
individual heterogeneity in taste for schooling (academic ability). Finally, εSit
is a purely stochastic shock.
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3.3 Household Production
The utility of household production, Uhit, is given by the following expression
Uhit = α
h
i + ε
h
it (2)
where αhi is individual speciﬁc utility of household activities and ε
h
it is a
stochastic shock.
3.4 Employment and Training
The utility of work and learning, U eit, and the utility of work with training,
Uait, are constructed as the diﬀerence between the wage rate and the monetary
costs of occupying a speciﬁc state. Precisely, U eit and U
a
it, and their related
costs, Ceit() and C
a
it(), are given by the following equations;
U
j
it = Wit − C
j
i (Sit, Hit, Eit, Ait) for j = e, a (3)
C
j
it() = c
j
0i + c1j · Sit + c2j ·Hit + c3j · Eit + c4j · Ait + ε
j
it for j = e, a (4)
where c1j , c2j, c3j and c4j are parameters capturing the eﬀect of accumulated
schooling, home time, employment and training on the cost (or disutility) of
work, or work and training. They illustrate the dynamics of skill accumula-
tion (skills beget skills). The εj′its are stochastic shocks.
The distinctions between static and dynamic models arise from alter-
native parametrization of equation (4). When both c1a and c1e equal 0,
schooling choices have no impact on future utilities, and we obtain the sta-
tic version of the model. When both c1a and c1e are negative (positive), we
obtain the skill-complementarity (skill-substitutability) model.13
3.5 Market Productivity
The reward to human capital investment is embedded in the following wage
equation
13We have deﬁned complementarity (and therefore substitutability) in terms of the
dynamic eﬀect of schooling (one input) on the total cost of accumulating skills. Obviously,
it would also be possible to model it in terms of total skills.
12
logWit = wit = α
w + λi · Sit + δi ·Eit + θi · Ait + ε
w
it (5)
where Wit is the wage rate per unit of time, α
w is the intercept term, and
λi, θi, δi are individual speciﬁc returns to schooling, learning, and training.
14
Altogether the vector {βi, δi, θi} summarizes individual labor market skills.
εwit is the stochastic term aﬀecting earnings.
3.6 The Bellman Equations
The choices are summarized in the binary indicators, dtk. Precisely, dtk = 1
when option k (w, h, w, a) is chosen. Given the Markovian structure of the
model, the solution to the problem is obtained using recursive methods, and
optimal choices may be characterized by a Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957).
For each possible choice k, there is a choice speciﬁc value function,
V kt (Ωt), equal to
V kt (Ωt) = U
k
t + βEmax{V
1
t+1(Ωt+1), ..V
K
t+1(Ωt+1) | dkt = 1} (6)
or, more compactly, as
V kt (Ωt) = U
k
t + βEVt+1(Ωt+1 | dkt = 1) (7)
where β is the discount factor, and where Ωt is the set containing all state
variables known by the agent at t.
3.7 The Distribution of Individual Heterogeneity and
Random Shocks
• The heterogeneity vector is distributed as a multi-variate discrete dis-
tribution with 20 vectors of support points;15
νr ∼ {α
S
r , α
H
r , λr, δr, θr, c
a
0r, βr; pr} for r = 1, 2, ..20 (8)
where pr is the population proportion of type r.
14Although it would also be possible to allow the intercept term to be individual speciﬁc,
the rich multiplicative heterogeneity structure makes it redundant.
15The heterogeneity structure is suﬃciently rich that we do not even need to introduce
an individual speciﬁc (or type speciﬁc) psychic cost of choosing employment (ce0).
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• (εsit, ε
h
it, ε
e
it, ε
a
it, ε
w
it} is a vector of i.i.d. mutually independent random
shocks. Each random shock follows a Normal distribution with mean
0 and variance σ(k) for k = s, h, e, a, w.
3.8 Model Solution
As is relatively common in the literature, we solve the Bellman equations
using simulated realizations of the random shocks. The Bellman equations
need to be solved for each single type separately. Our solution method is
exact in the sense that we do not use any approximation or interpolation
methods.
4 Calibration of the Model
Because it would be tedious to describe all parameters separately, we present
the general philosophy that underlies our choices. A set of parameters de-
scribing the heterogeneity components is found in appendix (Table A1). The
correlations are found in Table A2.
As a starting point, we choose hourly wages as the benchmark utility. To
choose the preference parameters, we relied mostly on the structural litera-
ture, in order to obtain a realistic range of the relevant parameters (when
possible). Then, we simulated the model and adjusted the parameters until
the ﬁnal values enabled us to match the population characteristics or the
population moments that we stated as desirable.
4.1 Outcome Equation and skills
The distribution of returns to schooling is centered at 0.06 (a value close
to estimates reported in the structural literature). However, we allow for a
high degree of dispersion. The support of the distribution of returns ranges
between 0.00 and 0.12 (see Table A1). These numbers therefore reﬂect esti-
mates reported in both the structural and the IV literature.16
The average returns to learning (0.01) and training (0.03) are chosen to
reﬂect the fact that human capital accumulation is more intensive in state a
than in state e. They also ensure that the average life-cycle earnings growth
16A detailed comparison between structural and IV approach is found in Belzil (2007).
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will lie between 1% and 2% per year (a well known stylized fact for the
US). We treat the utility of school, the cost of on the job training and the
return to education as driven by an academic skill, and enforce a perfect
correlation between these components. However, to deviate from a trivial
ability bias structure, we assume that the return to work experience may be
driven by skills that may be non academic, and enforce a weak correlation
between these two components, and the other academic heterogeneity com-
ponents (the utility of school, the cost of on the job training and the return
to education).17
4.2 Post Schooling Dynamics
Our version of the dynamic skill accumulation is in the spirit of Ben-Porath
(1967).18 The parameters {c1a, c2a, c3a,c4a} and {c1e, c2e, c3e,c4e} are capturing
the eﬀect of accumulated schooling, home time, employment and training on
the cost (or disutility) of work/training (A) and work (E). The vectors are
equal to {-0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0) for state A, and {-0.3, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0) for state E.
The parameter values for c1a (-0.50) and c1e (-0.30) imply that accumulated
schooling reduces both the cost of investing in human capital and the cost of
labor market work. The larger eﬀect of education on the cost of training is
a reﬂection of the academic nature of the work/training activity. The non-
negative values for c3e and c4e allow us to introduce some dynamics in the
decision to work. The null values for c2a and c2e imply the absence of skill
depreciation.
4.3 Preference Heterogeneity and Discount Rates
To reﬂect preference heterogeneity, we allow discount rates to diﬀer across
individuals. They range between 0.00 and 0.10. The average discount rate
17In Belzil and Hansen (2002), the correlation is above 0.9. In Keane and Wolpin (1997),
the correlation between the utility of attending school and white collar skills would also
be very high.
18Dynamic skill accumulations models are rarely estimated. Keane and Wolpin (1997) is
the ﬁrst known empirical model where individual skills (occupation dependent) are accu-
mulated within a dynamic structure. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1999) are the ﬁrst to
implement a general equilibrium version of the Ben-Porath model. More recently, Adda,
Dustmann, Meghir and Robin (2005) have implemented a dynamic model of Apprentice-
ship and on-the-job training based on partial equilibrium search/matching arguments.
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(0.05) is standard. This form of preference heterogeneity may also be re-
interpreted as a way to approximate the eﬀects of liquidity constraints. It
is important to do so, because in the IV literature, the high IV estimates
are often conjectured to arise because they reﬂect the LATE parameters
of a subpopulation of individuals aﬀected by liquidity constraints, or of a
subpopulation of individuals who have high discount rates. As economics
oﬀers no guidance for the choice of a correlation between discount rates and
individual skills, we started the calibration procedure by imposing quasi or-
thogonality between discount factors and other heterogeneity components,
and adjusted the correlations in order to match population characteristics.
In other words, and as opposed to the correlations between various market
skills and the costs of training and schooling, we regarded the correlations
between discount rates and other heterogeneity components as secondary.
Indeed, they do not play a key role in our analysis.
4.4 Heterogeneity vs. Ex-Ante Risk
In order to calibrate the model, we must implicitly choose the relative impor-
tance of heterogeneity (cross sectional dispersion in skills) vs. ex-ante risk
(the variance of the random shocks aﬀecting the outcome equation). This
is diﬃcult. The structural literature on dynamic discrete choices always as-
sumes that individual speciﬁc heterogeneity is known by the agent, and that
random shocks are not. While the issue has only started recently to raise
interest, it is too early to establish a consensus.19 For this reason, we relied
on estimates reported in Belzil and Hansen (2007), who estimated a corre-
lated random coeﬃcient wage regression, and set the standard deviations of
all random shocks to 0.5.
5 The Control Groups
To generate each control group, we simulate 33 years of choices and wage
outcomes for 50,000 individuals. In our analysis, an individual is deﬁned
as the conjunction of (i) a heterogeneity type and (ii) a speciﬁc history of
random shocks. Precisely, we simulate 2500 diﬀerent sets of random shocks
19See Cunha and Heckman (2005) for a discussion.
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for each type (we have 20 types). For each model, we construct of a panel
data set that records choices and wages as follows:
{(dmk1i, w
m
1i), (d
m
k2i, w
m
2i), ............(d
m
k33i,w
m
33i)} i = 1, 2, .....50, 000
k = s, h, e, a
m = ST,DSC
where the index ST refers to the static model, andDSC refers to the dynamic
skill-complementarity model.
We provide a summary of individual choices in Table 1A (dynamic skill-
complementarity), and Table 1B (static). To do so, we computed the average
number of accumulated periods in each state for each model for period 1 to
period 10, as well as periods 15, 20, 25,30, and 33. The complete distrib-
ution of life-cycle schooling attainments is found in Table 1C. Overall, the
frequencies display the desired features that we advocated in Section 4. For
instance, schooling is chosen mostly in the ﬁrst 10 years. This is true for both
models. Home production is rarely chosen as it accounts for less than 10% of
total time allocation. The average schooling attainment is equal to 5.6 years
in the skill complementarity model and 4.0 years in the static model.
In total, individuals spend between 21 and 23 years in market production.
Moreover, the incidence of training (high accumulation state) is higher in the
skill complementarity model (5.4 years), than in the static model (4.2 years).
In order to illustrate the determinants of schooling, employment and
training decisions in the control group, we regressed the total number of
periods in each state on all relevant individual endowments. Because some
of the endowments are perfectly correlated, we only include those that are
linearly independent.20 These regressions are summarized in Table 2A, and
Table 2B. To facilitate comparison, each endowment has been standardized.
Aside from the fact that realized schooling are highly (positively) cor-
related with both individual returns to schooling and discount factors, it is
important to note that, in the dynamic skill-complementarity model, around
80% of schooling decisions are explained by heterogeneity (individual skills
and preferences). The fraction of total employment and training decisions
explained by heterogeneity are also comparable (84% and 83% respectively).
20For instance, the psychic costs of schooling, αS, and the psychic cost of work/training,
ca0, are not linearily independent.
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The results obtained for the static version of the model indicate a prac-
tically identical role for heterogeneity and ex-ante risk.
Obviously, as individual tastes and skills are never fully observed, it is
impossible to assert that this heterogeneity/risk decomposition is indeed re-
alistic. Nevertheless, it appears to be consistent with results reported in
Cuhna and Heckman (2005) and Belzil (2006).21
To illustrate the resulting relationship between wages, education, and
experience (for instance, to check concavity of age earnings proﬁles), we per-
formed OLS regressions of log wages on education, and potential experience
(using a cubic polynomial) for each control group. The results are in Tables
A3 and A4. The OLS estimates (above 0.10) are in all cases higher than the
population average return. Further, the parameter estimates for the eﬀect
of experience indicate that age earnings proﬁle are concave. The estimates
imply an average growth rate of 1% per year of potential market experience.22
6 Characterizing the Policy Interventions
6.1 The Design
Our deﬁnition of a mandatory schooling intervention is standard. It increases
average schooling in the population by setting a minimum age (period) for
leaving school. To be realistic, this mandatory level is below (or at most equal
to) the minimal number of periods needed to obtain the ex-ante average
educational attainment in the population. In the paper we consider two
diﬀerent dictatorial interventions; a two-year and a four-year compulsory
schooling policy.
Each education subsidy consists of oﬀering a reward conditional on at-
taining a precise grade level. To illustrate the design ﬂexibility of incentive
21Cuhna and Heckman (1986) report that between 50% and 80% of the econometrician
error term is actually heterogeneity (known to the agent). Belzil (2006), using a completely
diﬀerent method, reaches a similar conclusion.
22Although we did not want to impose any speciﬁc relationship between education and
age-earnings proﬁles, we noted that our model implies a positive eﬀect for the interaction
between education and experience. This would be the case, for instance, with data taken
from the NLSY.
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policies, we consider education subsidies implemented at diﬀerent grade lev-
els, and of unequal duration.
All policy interventions considered in the paper are described below.
• Two-Year mandatory education: The ﬁrst two years are spent in
school (ds1i = ds2i = 1∀i)
• Four year mandatory education: The ﬁrst four years are spent in
school (ds1i = ds2i = ds3i = ds4i = 1∀i)
• Higher Education Subsidy: A 2$ payment is awarded upon reaching
grade level 9. This subsidy is paid for each period of school attendance
until the maximum grade level (11) is reached.
• Intermediate Education subsidy: A 2$ payment is awarded upon
reaching grade level 5. This subsidy is paid for each period of school
attendance until the maximum grade level (11) is reached.
• Basic Education subsidy: A 2$ payment is awarded from grade 1
to grade 4 (inclusively). The subsidy is terminated after completion of
grade 4.23
Altogether, this set of policy interventions are representative of the degree
of ﬂexibility (or lack thereof) inherent to each class of intervention. For
instance, the basic education subsidy is naturally compared to the four year
mandatory schooling regulation, because payment is made over the same
period covered by the mandatory schooling. However, the monetary level of
the subsidy can be manipulated so to avoid aﬀecting the lower tail.
The Intermediate and higher education subsidies work diﬀerently. These
subsidies are claimed upon reaching a relatively higher grade level, and are
therefore not expected to aﬀect the lower tail of the distribution. At a purely
intuitive level, it is clear that the beneﬁt of the intermediate and the higher
education subsidies is largely damped by individual discounting. For in-
stance, basic education subsidies should be much less aﬀected by discounting,
since the beneﬁt is perceived already in period 1.
23For each case (intermediate and higher education), we actually changed the amount
of the subsidy. The low, median and high subsidies were respectively equal to 1$, 2$, and
3$. However, to simplify the presentation, we report results obtained from the median
subsidy.
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Compulsory schooling regulations, on the other hand, have for only ﬂex-
ibility the possibility to increase the minimum number of periods in school.
In presence of positive selection, and as the minimum number of periods is
increased, the policy aﬀects a population that is increasingly representative.
However, for realistic compulsory levels, these interventions are bound to
aﬀect a set of individuals that comprise a large fraction of very low ability
individuals.
In total, we generate 5 diﬀerent treatment groups (2 compulsory schooling
interventions, and 3 education subsidies) for each model:
{(dmΥk1i , w
mΥ
1i ), (d
mΥ
k2i , w
mΥ
2i ), ............(d
mΥ
k33i,w
mΥ
33i )} i = 1, 2, .....50, 000,
k = s, h, e, a
m = ST,DSC
Υ = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
For each combination of intervention and model, we deﬁne the individual
speciﬁc counterfactual reaction to policy intervention Υ, given model m,
which we denote Rit(Υ;m), as
Rit(Υ;m) = Sit (Υ;m)− Sit (control;m) (9)
Consistent with our deﬁnition of an individual, the Rit(Υ;m)
′s are measured
while holding ﬁxed each individual speciﬁc random shock history. To avoid
confusion, we will omit the time subscript in Rit(Υ), since we want to focus
on total schooling attainments. So, in practice, we deﬁne Ri(Υ;m) as simply
Si,33 (Υ;m)− Si,33 (control;m).24
With a vector of individual counterfactual reactions for each speciﬁc inter-
vention, we can now investigate the properties of the conditional distribution
of these reactions; namely
FRi(ri(Υ;m) | νi) ≡ FRi(ri(Υ;m) | λi, δi, θi, βi, α
S
i , α
H
i , c
a
0i)
So, as we move across policy interventions, it is also possible to assess the
corresponding change in the degree of dependence between the ri(Υ;m)’s
and the full set of individual characteristics.
24In practice, the parameter representing the psychic cost of returning to school ensures
that accumulated schooling remains ﬁxed from period 13 onward.
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6.2 An Economic Analysis
The main eﬀects of the policy interventions are summarized in Table 3. In
order to relate the eﬀects of the policy changes to the primitive objects of the
model (individual endowments), we regressed the counterfactual individual
reactions to policy intervention (the Ri(I)
′s) on all relevant individual endow-
ments (the full vector of skills and tastes). The regressions are summarized
in Table 4A, and Table 4B. They allow us to determine which individual skill
or which preference component is more important in explaining individual
reactions to policy changes.
Because of its intrinsic counterfactual nature, computing the LATE re-
quires to hold the vector of realized random shocks constant for each indi-
vidual. For this reason, they are computed using the same realizations of
the random shock vector that were used to generate the control group.25 In
other words, we evaluate the counterfactual eﬀects of the new policy by com-
puting individual decisions of the control group under the old regime, as well
as under the new regime, while holding individual random shock histories
constant. This guarantees that the Monotonicity condition will hold.
To present our economic analysis, it will be useful to select a speciﬁc set
of measures, and to evaluate the diﬀerences as well as the commonalities of
the subsidy and the mandatory schooling experiments. We focus our presen-
tation on 3 aspects; the fraction of the population aﬀected, the labor market
skills of the population aﬀected (the LATE of education, work/training and
work/learning, and ex-ante education), and the eﬀect of the discount rate
on the individual reactions to policy interventions (because it often plays a
key role in the interpretation of IV estimates). All these measures are either
found in Table 3, or in Table 4A, or Table 4B.
6.2.1 The Density of the sub-populations affected
As normally expected, the summary statistics of Table 3 reveal that the
intermediate level subsidy aﬀects a higher fraction of the population than the
subsidy paid conditionally on reaching grade level 9. This is true regardless
of the model structure.
25Because the LATE parameters are computed from 50,000 realizations of the vector of
random shocks, their sampling variability turn out to be very small. As a consequence,
we treat it as a population parameters.
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As an example, for the dynamic skill-complementarity model, the inter-
mediate level subsidy aﬀects 24%. When the subsidy is delayed until grade
9, the fraction of the population aﬀected drops to 9.1%.
As mentioned earlier, the lower education subsidy is of a diﬀerent nature.
It pays individuals to attend school during the ﬁrst 4 years only, as opposed
to the intermediate level subsidy. Despite all this, it aﬀects more individuals
than the intermediate subsidy (around 26% of the population is aﬀected by
the basic schooling subsidy). However, this may be easily explained by the
fact that the basic school subsidy is less aﬀected by discounting.
In comparison, 25.8% of the population is aﬀected by the two-year manda-
tory schooling regulation. This fraction is very close to those observed for
the intermediate level and the lower education subsidies. Not surprisingly,
the four-year mandatory schooling aﬀects a larger fraction of the popula-
tion (34.6%) than the two-year compulsory schooling reform. This fraction
should naturally be compared to the fraction of individuals aﬀected by the
lower education subsidy (26.2 %). Although very high in relation to expected
earnings, the 2$ subsidy is not suﬃciently high to aﬀect all those who are
aﬀected by the 4-year compulsory regulation. As indicated earlier, this illus-
trates the diﬀerence in design ﬂexibility between compulsory schooling and
education subsidy.
Turning to the static version of the behavioral model, we observe a gen-
erally lower fraction of individuals aﬀected by the subsidies, along with a
higher fraction of people aﬀected by the compulsory schooling regulation.
These features are easily explained by the relatively lower average level of
education generated by the static model, since the incentive to obtain edu-
cation is reduced.
6.2.2 The skills of the sub-population affected
Again, we start with the dynamic skill-complementarity model structure.
The LATE of education in the intermediate level subsidy is equal to 0.0717,
and indicates that those aﬀected tend to have relatively high skills, but are
not too far from the population average. This tendency is also mirrored
in the level of pre-intervention schooling, which is between 6 and 7 years,
and therefore also not too far from the population average ex-ante level of
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schooling (around 6 years).26
When the implementation of the subsidy is delayed until one is faced with
the choice of entering grade level 9, the policy has the obvious implication
of aﬀecting an even more selective sub-population. The counterpart of this
increase in selectivity is mirrored in the average returns to skills of those
aﬀected. The education Late parameters exceeds 0.08 (it is 0.0809). Not
surprisingly, the higher education subsidy is more eﬀective for those who
would have reached an even higher level of schooling (when compared to the
intermediate level subsidy). Precisely, the average pre-intervention level of
schooling of those aﬀected is around 8.4 years.
We now consider the opposite, and ask what happens when the subsidy is
implemented for the ﬁrst 4 years only (the basic schooling level). Intuitively,
this policy should reach a larger proportion of low skill individuals than both
the intermediate and the higher education subsidies. This is exempliﬁed by
the education LATE parameter (0.0369) and the ex-ante average education
(2.7 years).
As logically expected from the mandatory schooling interventions, the
average returns for those aﬀected is much below the population average.
Precisely, the local average treatment eﬀect for the two-year regulation is
equal to 0.0303, and it is equal to 0.0376 for the four-year policy. However,
the most striking diﬀerence is at the level of the pre-intervention schooling,
which is equal to 1.11 years of schooling in the two-year regulation, and
2.89 for the 4 year regulation. These numbers are much lower than those
just reviewed for the subsidy interventions.27 As noted earlier, this is an
unavoidable feature of the mandatory schooling intervention.
The conclusions remain unchanged when the same policies are applied to
the static model structure, even though it implies lower average schooling
in the population, because the incentives to get educated are weaker. How-
ever, in relative terms, the distinction between education subsidies and the
mandatory schooling interventions remain unchanged.
To summarize, mandatory schooling policies always aﬀect a sub-populations
that are endowed with low skill levels, as well as relatively low returns to
26Recall that the average level of schooling in the control group is between 5 and 6 years.
27The average is above 2.0 simply because our model allows individual to leave and
return to school. So, it is possible for an individual who would have obtained more than
2 years ex-ante, to be aﬀected by the dictatorial intervention. However, as indicated by
the average (2.11), this type of behavior is relatively infrequent.
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skill. Education subsidies, on the other hand, are ﬂexible enough to aﬀect
both low-skill and high-skill individuals.
6.2.3 The Role of the Rate of Time Preference
To get a formal picture of the impact of the rate of time preference (the only
fundamental preference parameter in our model), it is useful to examine the
regressions of the counterfactual individual changes in schooling on individual
endowments (Table 4A, Table 4B).
As earlier, we focus on the dynamic skill-complementarity model, and re-
turn to the static model later. For the intermediate education level subsidy,
the simulations indicate that counterfactual schooling reactions decrease (in-
crease) with the discount factor (rate). In order to explain it, it is useful
to visualize two distinct eﬀects that play at the same time. The eﬀect of
the education subsidy works through the future component of the utility of
attending school. This eﬀect, other things equal, must increase with the
discount factor. In other words, those who value the future most, are also
most likely to react to the subsidy experiment. However, when the subsidy is
implemented early enough, it may also aﬀect a pool of individuals who have
lower (higher) discount factors (rates). So, in total, the correlation between
individual reactions and discount rates is ambiguous. In our model, the neg-
ative eﬀect of discount factors appears to be dominant, when the subsidy is
implemented from grade 5 onward (second column, Table 4A) and when it
is implemented in the ﬁrst 4 years only (ﬁrst column, Table 4A).
However, as we delay the education subsidy until grade level 9, the neg-
ative eﬀect should gradually vanish. This is indeed what may be inferred
upon examining the third column of Table 4A. Delaying the subsidy until
higher education has changed the relationship between discount factors and
individual reactions, as the regressions indicate that individual increases in
schooling are increasing (decreasing) with the discount factor (rate). In other
words, those who value the future most, are also most likely to react to the
subsidy experiment.
Finally, and not surprisingly, counterfactual changes decrease (increase)
with the discount factor (rate) within the compulsory schooling experiment.
This is easily explained. Other things equal, those would are low educated
ex-ante (and who are aﬀected by mandatory schooling), also tend to have
lower discount factor (higher discount rates). In other words, those who tend
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to get very low levels of schooling ex-ante tend to discount the future heavily.
This is true for both the two-year and the four-year compulsory reforms.
These results translate almost perfectly into the static model framework
(Table 4B). That is, aside from the subsidy implemented at level 9, we ob-
serve that counterfactual changes decrease (increase) with the discount factor
(rate).
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7 Defining Post-Intervention Randomization
We now turn to the notion of PIR. Broadly speaking we deﬁne it as the degree
of selection on individual endowments among the sub-population aﬀected.
Although it is one of the dimensions that help characterizing diﬀerent types
of policy interventions, it also has immediate impact for IV estimations. For
this reason, we devote a separate section to it.
7.1 Definition
In the empirical IV literature, pre-intervention randomization is what prac-
tically deﬁnes “exogeneity” of a given policy intervention. In our context,
Pre-Intervention Randomization guarantees that
Fνi(. | Zi = 1) = Fνi(. | Zi = 0) (10)
In other words, the distribution of individual ﬁxed endowments are invari-
ant to policy exposure. For the sake of presentation, it is informative to
distinguish between the distribution of heterogeneity endowments of those
aﬀected, F aνi(.), and those unaﬀected F
u
νi
(.). More precisely,
F aνi(.; Υ,m) = Fνi(. | ri(I) > 0,Υ;m)
F uνi(.; Υ,m) = Fνi(. | ri(I) = 0,Υ;m)
For any policy intervention Υ (given a model m), we deﬁne (perfect)
“PIR” as the realization of the following condition:
Fνi(. | ri(I) = 0,Υ;m) = Fνi(. | ri(I) > 0,Υ;m) (11)
7.2 An illustration with a simple binary choice model
To illustrate the diﬃculty of achieving PIR, it is informative to consider a
simplistic case in which schooling decision is binary (S = 1 or S = 0), and in
which heterogeneity is a scalar. The CDF of θ is denoted F (.) and its density
f(.).
Formally, we have
Si = I(θi > 0)
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A dictatorial intervention Υd splits the region into two distinct sets; Θud
and Θad, where Θud denotes the set of values of θ of those unaﬀected by Υd,
and Θad denotes the set of values of θ of those aﬀected. It follows that
Θad = {θ | θ ≤ 0} (12)
Θud = {θ | θ > 0}
and that max(θ) | θ ∈ Θud ≤ min(θ) | θ ∈ Θad. The two sets are disjoint:
Θad ∩Θud = ∅
and it is impossible to equate F uθ (.; Υ
d) to F aθ (.; Υ
d). Indeed, it is not even
possible to equate the ﬁrst moments since, by deﬁnition,
E{θ | θ ∈ Θad} ≡
∫ 0
−∞
f(θi)θdθ
F (0)
=
E{θ | θ ∈ Θud} ≡
∫
∞
0
f(θi)θdθ
1− F (0)
(13)
Now, consider a subsidy policy Υs which increases the utility additively by
an amount s, which we assume to be strictly positive. The decision criterion
is simply
Si = I(θi + s > 0)
and the policy splits the support of θ into three distinct sets.
The set of those aﬀected is given by the following;
Θas = {θ | −s < θ < 0} (14)
The set of those unaﬀected, Θus, is composed a two subsets. One subset
is comprised of those who choose S = 0 in presence and in absence of the
subsidy. This set, denoted Θus0, is deﬁned as
Θus0 = {θ | θ < −c} (15)
The other subset covers the individuals who exercise S = 1 both in pres-
ence and in absence of the subsidy. This subset, denoted Θus1, is made of
those individuals who are endowed with high values of θ, and is deﬁned as
Θus1 = {θ | θ > 0} (16)
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So, the total set of those unaﬀected is also disjoint, and it is simply
Θus = Θus0 ∪Θus1 (17)
As for the dictatorial experiment, Θus and Θas have diﬀerent supports (Θas∩
Θus = ∅). However, the structure of those sets suggests that one could
manipulate the subsidy so to equalize the ﬁrst moments of F uθ (.; Υ
s) and
F aθ (.; Υ
s). In practice, this entails ﬁnding a value s′ : 0 < s′ <∞, such that
E{θ | θ ∈ Θas} = E{θ | θ ∈ Θus} (18)
More precisely, we must ﬁnd s′ such that
E{θ | θ ∈ Θas} ≡
∫ 0
−s
f(θi)θ
F (0)− F (−s)
dθ =
E{θ | θ ∈ Θus} ≡
∫
−s
−∞
f(θi)θdθ +
∫
∞
0 f(θi)θdθ
F (−s) + (1− F (0))
(19)
Indeed, under some restriction of the distribution of θ that guarantees exis-
tence of lims′→0E{θ | θ ∈ Θas}, it would be possible to prove existence.28
Obviously, the binary choice model we just considered is much simpler
than the life-cycle skill accumulation model. First, in our model, schooling
decisions are not binary. Second, those decisions are subject to the realiza-
tions of random shocks, so that the reservation values are stochastic. Thirdly,
the heterogeneity terms are represented by a relatively high dimensional vec-
tor which may have eﬀects of opposite signs on realized schooling. Finally,
as schooling may take many values, the subsidy may be constructed as a full
sequence of non-negative numbers.
So, in such a multi-dimensional/multi-period framework, and despite that
analytical results may not be obtained, simple intuition suggests that a sub-
sidy policy may be manipulated so to equate (at least) the ﬁrst moments of
28For instance, assuming existence of lims′→0E{θ | θ ∈ Θ
as}, it would be suﬃcient to
show that lims′→0E{θ | θ ∈ Θas} < lims′→0E{θ | θ ∈ Θus} and that lims′→∞E{θ | θ ∈
Θas}> lims′→∞E{θ | θ ∈ Θ
us}. Then, using continuity these arguments with respect to
s′, it would follow that equality must be fullﬁlled at some s′.
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F aνi(.) and F
a
νi
(.). Indeed, in a case where individuals decisions are aﬀected by
random shocks, it is not even clear that perfect post-intervention realization
may not be achieved.
To anticipate on Section 8, it relatively easy to see why the capacity to
use a policy intervention that oﬀers a high degree of PIR may be attractive.
When a policy interventions creates seemingly identical sub-populations of
individuals aﬀected and unaﬀected, the estimation of a relevant treatment ef-
fect is much less likely to be confounded with subsequent unobserved choices.
7.3 Evaluating the Degree of Post-Intervention Ran-
domization
We now return to our original model. The issue is to investigate which class
of interventions tend to generate a more “randomized” sub-population of in-
dividuals aﬀected. One direct way of verifying it, is to use the fraction of
the total variance of individual reactions explained by skills and tastes for
each model and intervention combination. Another possibility is to regress
individual reactions on ex-ante schooling . A weak marginal eﬀect of ex-ante
schooling (a weak correlation) would indicate a low degree of selection based
on-ex-ante schooling, which itself, would most likely signal a weak correla-
tion between individual endowments and counterfactual reactions. These
marginal eﬀects, along with the R squares of Table 4A and Table 4B, are
reported in column 1 of a summary table (Table 4C).
Upon examination of Table 4C, one notes that individual skills and pref-
erences account for 10% of individual reactions to the intermediate education
subsidy intervention, and for 6% for the higher education subsidy (within the
dynamic skill-complementarity model). As expected, the implementation of
a subsidy at basic schooling level should display more selective eﬀects, since
it may loose the opportunity to aﬀect the upper tail of the distribution of
abilities, but aﬀects more strongly the lower tail. Precisely, individual skills
and preferences account for 31% of individual reactions to the low education
subsidy intervention.
When the static model is assumed to be the data generating process,
the fractions are practically identical. In economic terms, these numbers
indicate that randomness plays a large part in determining the counterfac-
tual reactions to policy interventions. In practice, this implies that there
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is a non-negligible degree of randomization that takes place after the policy
intervention.
The regressions applied to the mandatory schooling interventions disclose
a completely diﬀerent picture. Individual skills and preferences account for
47% of individual reactions to the two-year mandatory schooling regulation,
and as much as 60% for the four-years reform, within the dynamic skill-
complementarity model. This fundamental diﬀerence between dictatorial
and incentive-based interventions is in no way linked with a speciﬁc model.
Virtually identical results are obtained with the static model structure (51%
and 70%).
Finally, a quick examination of the marginal eﬀects of education (ex-
ante) on individual reactions found in the second column of Table 3C lead
to a similar conclusion. Except for the subsidy set over the ﬁrst 4 years,
the marginal eﬀects of the other subsidies are almost 10 times lower in ab-
solute values than those computed for the mandatory schooling regulations.
These numbers illustrate again the capacity of subsidy policies to generate a
“randomized” set of individuals aﬀected by it.
7.3.1 A Summary of the main differences between Education sub-
sidies and Mandatory Schooling
To summarize, and with respect to all measures that we have chosen to char-
acterize the diﬀerent policy interventions, there is a fundamental asymmetry
between incentive-based and dictatorial policy interventions. This is a result
of the inherent diﬀerence in the degree of design ﬂexibility between those two
families of interventions.
Because incentive-based policies may be designed so to aﬀect a particular
set of individuals, they are therefore able to generate a relatively represen-
tative (randomized) group of individuals aﬀected by it. Apart from those
who belong to the extreme upper tail of the distribution (those who exercise
the maximum consumption level ex-ante), incentive based policies may target
virtually any group of individuals. Dictatorial policies that enforce minimum
consumption, do not have this degree of ﬂexibility. By deﬁnition, a minimum
consumption regulation aﬀects the bottom of the skill distribution.
In the particular context of education policies, and with reference to our
model, this diﬀerence is striking. Both intermediate and higher education
subsidies aﬀect a set of individuals whose average skill levels are much closer
30
to population average than the compulsory schooling regulation. The relative
ﬂexibility of education subsidies is also exempliﬁed in terms of the statistical
strength (proportion of individuals aﬀected) and in terms of the eﬀect of the
discount rates. Depending on the timing of the policy, diﬀerent subsidies that
are characterized by the same monetary amount, may aﬀect of diﬀerent sets
of individuals. Finally, while a subsidy policy may aﬀect individuals with
higher discount rates as well as lower discount rates, a compulsory schooling
aﬀects individual with higher discount rates.
8 IV Estimation and Post-Intervention Ran-
domization
We now turn to the implementation of classical IV estimates. This consti-
tutes the second stage of our analysis.
8.1 The Implication of Post-Intervention Randomiza-
tion for IV Estimation
In order to interpret IV in a dynamic setting, it is useful to re-express the
log wage regression as follows:
wit = λ0 + λ¯ · Sit + ε
∗
it (20)
where
ε∗it = ϕit(.) + ωλi · Si + ε
W
it
ϕit(.) = δi · Eit + θi ·Ait
ωλi = λi − λ¯
The term λ¯ is the population average return to schooling, , λ0 is an intercept
term, λ¯ is the population average and ε∗it is the composite error term which
contains three distinct elements.
The crucial term is ϕ(.). It collapses the eﬀects of all post-schooling
choices made until date t.29 At any period t, it is deﬁned as the sum of each in-
29The model allows individuals to leave school for work, and to return to school
subsequently.
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dividual post-schooling choices (the A′its and E
′
its), which are pre-multiplied
by the proper individual return to employment and training. More generally,
ϕ(.) depends on the entire heterogeneity distribution (not only the returns),
and on accumulated schooling (in the case where schooling aﬀects the cost
of training). It also depends indirectly on the policy shock indicator (Z).
From now on, we remove the model subscript (m) so to simplify notation.
In the static case, we have that
ϕit(Υ) = Φ
Υ(νi) (21)
while in the dynamic model, we have
ϕit(Υ) = Φ
Υ(Sit(νi), νi) (22)
where νi = λi, δi, θi, βi, α
S
i , α
H
i , c
a
0i, and where Φ
Υ(.) is a function that maps
endowments and schooling (in the dynamic case), onto post-schooling skill
accumulation.
The term ϕit(.) is what renders IV estimation precarious. In a setting
where the error term is now re-interpreted as a collection of post-schooling
choices, the diﬀerence between treatment and control not only consists of
schooling choices made by those aﬀected by the policy, but also of post-
schooling choices that are themselves correlated with schooling, as well as
ﬁxed endowments. So, given that some positive fraction of the individuals
are aﬀected by a policy (and increase their schooling level), identifying the
treatment eﬀect of education requires absence of diﬀerences in post-schooling
behavior between those aﬀected and those who are not.
Although PIR is not needed in order to estimate the treatment eﬀect
(LATE) of schooling, we expect it to be highly correlated with the fulﬁllment
the identifying orthogonality conditions. We now examine the implications of
the nature of the intervention for the potential realization of the identifying
orthogonality conditions.
Let’s re-consider the orthogonality conditions, and without loss of gener-
ality, re-express post-schooling choices as
ϕit(Υ) = ϕit(. | ri(Υ) = 0) · I(ri(Υ) = 0) + (23)
ϕit(. | ri(Υ) > 0) · I(ri(Υ) > 0)}
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where I(.) is the indicator function equal to1 when individual i belongs to
the set identiﬁed in parenthesis (either ri(Υ) = 0, or ri(Υ) > 0). Before
doing so, we deﬁne a binary indicator, xΥi , that splits the population into
two groups (those aﬀected, and those who are not) as follows:
xΥi = I(ri(Υ) > 0) (24)
In the static case, the realization of the IV identifying moment condition
may be interpreted as follows:
Corr{ϕit(Υ), x
Υ
i } = Corr{ϕit(Υ), x
Υ
i } = 0 (25)
or, as follows:
Corr{ϕit(Υ), x
Υ
i } = Corr{ϕit(Sit(x
Υ
i ), x
Υ
i ), x
Υ
i } = 0 (26)
in the dynamic case.
8.1.1 The Static Model
This is the simplest case. When past choices (schooling) have no impact on
φit(.), after conditioning on heterogeneity, PIR will contribute to diminish
the correlation between ϕit(.) and the treatment/control indicator, simply
because ϕit(. | ri(Υ) = 0) will approach ϕit(. | ri(Υ) > 0). So, in other
words, as PIR becomes more important, Corr{ϕit(xΥi ), x
Υ
i } vanishes. The
intervention that oﬀers more PIR is also more likely to result in the realization
of the orthogonality condition.
8.1.2 The Dynamic Skill-Complementarity Model
To analyze the dynamic representation, we must ﬁrst assume that the sign
of correlation between Sit and x
Υ
i is the same as the correlation between
ϕit and x
Υ
i (after conditioning on Sit). In practice, this implies that when a
policy intervention splits the population into two groups (those aﬀected and
those who are not), the group that has the highest level of post-schooling
accumulated skills (after removing the eﬀect of schooling if the model is
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dynamic) must also have higher schooling attainments. This assumption is
basically in line with the popular positive “Ability Bias” hypothesis.30
When schooling increases the intensity of post-schooling accumulation,
diﬀerences in endowments between those aﬀected and those who are not,
are reinforced by the eﬀect of schooling on post-schooling accumulation. In
such a case, there would be a clear beneﬁt to using a policy intervention
that oﬀers PIR, and we should also expect incentive-based experiments to
outperform dictatorial experiments. Indeed, the superiority of incentive-
based interventions should be even more obvious in such a case.
8.1.3 Skill-Susbtitutability
While the static and the skill-complementarity speciﬁcations of the outcome
equation represent a relatively wide class of models, it is important to note
that if schooling decreases ϕit (and we retain the assumption that the signs of
the eﬀects of xΥi on schooling and post-schooling accumulation are identical),
nothing can be said about the desirability of PIR. In such a case, the relative
performance of incentive-based and dictatorial experiments depends on the
relative importance of the dynamic eﬀect and selectivity. In a returns to
schooling framework, it implies that schooling reduces post-schooling wage
growth. This would be highly counterintuitive. For this reason, our presen-
tation focuses almost entirely on the static and the skill complementarity
models.
9 Implementing IV Estimation
We now proceed with the core of the second step of our analysis, namely
the estimation of the returns to schooling using both the dictatorial and the
incentive policy interventions as instruments.
30In the classical literature, the positive ability bias hypothesis (or OLS bias) states
that, within an linear regression of wages on schooling, those who have more schooling,
also tend to have a higher value of the error term (interpreted as ability). We therefore
rule out the rather unrealistic case where a policy intervention would aﬀect more (less)
able individuals, and who in turn, would have less (more) schooling than those unaﬀected.
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9.1 Creating a Cross-Sectional Data Set
In order to build the treatment groups, we proceed as we did for the control
groups. Again, each type of individuals is duplicated in 250 diﬀerent real-
izations of the random vector (for a total of 50,000 units). We simulate 33
years of choices and wage outcomes under the new policy, as described in the
previous section. To mimic what is achieved in observational cross-section
data, we ﬁrst select one time period per-individual. The period is selected
randomly between period 5 and period 33. We do so because most actual
cross-section data sets contain wages that are realized over the entire life
cycle, but do not include very young workers.31 To do so, we use a uniform
random number generator. We end up with 100,000 observations (50,000 in
control and 50,000 in treatment).
In the second step, we use simulated choices, and construct a sub-population
of individuals who are either in state e or state a at the actual period ran-
domly selected. If this condition is satisﬁed for an individual, we record the
wage as non-missing and include it in the cross-section used to implement
IV.
9.2 The Dynamic Skill-Complementarity Model
For exposition purposes, we start by describing IV results applied to the
Dynamic-Skill-Complementarity model. We do so for two main reasons.
First, it is the model structure that should normally display the highest
sensitivity to the degree of PIR. As a consequence, the distinction between
IV estimates coming from dictatorial and incentive interventions should come
out clearly.
Second, on a purely economic basis, the dynamic skill-complementarity
model as the most interesting speciﬁcation. Indeed, it is also likely to be the
most realistic.
9.2.1 The Education Subsidies
The IV estimates obtained when the data generating process is the dynamic
skill-complementarity model are reported in the upper portion of Table 5.
31In our model, period 5 would be naturally compared to the period at which individuals
decide to enter higher education (say, around 18 years of age).
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Evidently, the IV estimate associated to the intermediate level subsidy,
which is equal to 0.0715, lies within a very narrow distance of the population
LATE (0.0717). It is also relatively precise with a standard error equal
to 0.01. There is an obvious way to explain the good performance of IV.
The low correlation between Z and post-schooling choices, equal to 0.0019,
practically imply orthogonality between policy exposure and post-schooling
skill accumulation.
As normally expected, the higher education subsidy generates a weaker
instrument as indicated by the relative imprecision of the IV estimate (the
standard error is equal to 0.03), or by the correlation between schooling and
policy exposure (equal to 0.0183). Although the IV point estimate, equal to
0.0846, is targeting a population LATE parameter equal to 0.0809, it would
be imprudent to conclude that it is performing well. We do not analyze it
further.
In an earlier section, we already pointed out the diﬀerence between the
lower education subsidy and the subsidies that are set at the intermediate
level. Indeed, the basic education subsidy may be compared to 4-year manda-
tory schooling policy (because it is set over the same period), which will be
analyzed below. At this stage, it is suﬃcient to note that the IV estimate,
equal to -0.0894 with a standard error equal to 0.02, fails spectacularly to
estimate its estimand (0.0369). It lies outside the support of the distribution
of returns. It is certainly less precise than the intermediate level subsidy but
more precise than the higher education subsidy. As argued earlier, this may
be simply explained by discounting.
As indicated earlier, a diﬀerent way to visualize the realization of orthog-
onality conditions, is to investigate post-schooling accumulation within the
treatment group. To provide a better explanation of the results, we took all
observations of the treatment group, and regressed post-schooling accumu-
lation (ϕit(.) on a set of regressors that include (i) the variable that records
if an individual has been aﬀected (xΥi ), (ii) post-intervention schooling and
its square, as well as (iii) age and its square. We focus on the estimate as-
sociated to the variable that records if an individual has been aﬀected, since
it tells us how important are diﬀerences in accumulation, after removing the
eﬀect of schooling, and more particularly, how this marginal eﬀect may vary
across policy interventions. The results of the regressions for the dynamic
skill-complementarity model are in Table 6A.
The impact of PIR is obvious upon examination of the ﬁrst three columns
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of Table 6A, which are devoted to the education subsidies. One has to
examine the parameter estimates obtained for the variable that records if
an individual has been aﬀected (xΥi ). These estimates (equal to -0.0005 for
the intermediate level, and -0.0001 for higher education) are miniscule, and
insigniﬁcant. They reveal simply the absence of diﬀerences in post-schooling
behavior between those aﬀected and those who are not. This is why, in
this particular context, IV is capable of identifying the true causal eﬀect
of education on wages. However, the corresponding parameter obtained for
the lower education subsidies, -0.0142, illustrates the opposite outcome. This
estimate, which is in relative term quite enormous, simply illustrates that the
lower education subsidy appears to aﬀect a highly selective sub-population.
The post-schooling accumulation behavior of this sub-population prevents
the econometrician from inferring the proper return to schooling.
9.2.2 Mandatory Schooling
We now analyze the IV obtained from the mandatory schooling interventions
set at a minimum of 2 years and 4 years. Not surprisingly, the 4-year manda-
tory schooling intervention generates a stronger instrument than the 2-year
compulsory schooling regulation. However, and regardless of the statistical
strength of the intervention, the instruments generated by mandatory school-
ing reforms are incapable of estimating the proper local average treatment
eﬀects.32 As argued earlier, the accuracy of IV will depend on the capacity of
the policy intervention to generate enough PIR. However, there is no guar-
antee that a stronger instrument generates a more dispersed sub-population.
Other things equal, we already have shown that the mandatory schooling
experiment implies a highly selective sub-population of individuals aﬀected.
The consequences of this lack of randomization is now clear. The IV
estimate, equal to -0.1198 (with a standard error equal to 0.02) lies outside
the support of the distribution of returns, and moreover, is nowhere near
its population counterpart (0.03). The negativity of the estimates is also
easy to explain. Our model is calibrated according to a skill complementar-
ity hypothesis. That is it assumes that skills beget skills, and as a conse-
quence, a higher level of skills conveys higher post-schooling wage growth.
32As the reader may have noticed, in a context where individuals continue to exercise
choices beyond policy intervention, and beyond school completion, access to a strong
instrument is no longer automatically desirable.
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The mandatory schooling experiment, which aﬀects mostly a low skill pop-
ulation, large negative correlation between the control/treatment indicator
and post schooling wage growth (-0.0295). This is 10 to 20 times higher than
the corresponding correlations obtained in the subsidy interventions. These
diﬀerences coexist even though the correlations between schooling and the
policy shock indicator are relatively similar across policy interventions.33 As
a result, the IV estimate lies within a region that is far away from the pop-
ulation average (while the population LATE parameters are within some
reasonable distance from the population average). Although increasing the
minimum schooling requirement has slightly improved the performance of
the IV estimate, which is now equal to -0.0846 for a population parameter
equal to 0.0303, there is still evidence that IV is incapable of estimating the
relevant treatment eﬀect. This is well illustrated by the higher correlation (in
absolute value) between the control/treatment indicator and post schooling
wage growth (-0.0485).
As we did before, we now investigate post-schooling accumulation be-
havior within the treatment group, and compare the results with what was
obtained with the education subsidies. The parameters associated to xΥi ,
and obtained for the 2-year and 4-year compulsory schooling, are found in
the last 2 columns of Table 6A. They are respectively equal to -0.0108 and
-0.0162, and are 20 to 100 times larger than those found for the interme-
diate and higher education subsidies. They are, however, comparable, with
the estimates obtained for the basic schooling subsidy. They indicate clearly
that the set of individuals aﬀected by the mandatory schooling reforms is
highly selective, and displays post-schooling behavior signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the set of those unaﬀected. It explains why IV confounds wage growth
induced by schooling. with post-schooling skill accumulation.
33Obviously, our analysis has also implications for the economics of the weak/strong
instrument paradigm. Within a dynamic skill accumulation model aﬀected by multi-
variate heterogeneity, the correlation between the instrument and the structural elements
of the composite error term also change when the correlation between schooling and the
instrument varies. As a result, increasing (reducing) the power of an instrument does not
guarantee a reduction (increase) in the asymptotic bias. However, we focus our discussion
on the distinction between incentive and dictatorial interventions.
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9.3 The Static Model
When the outcome equation is aﬀected by subsequent choices, that are solely
driven by persistent skills and tastes, we already established that the inter-
vention generating more post intervention randomization would also perform
the best, although the diﬀerence between compulsory and incentive-based in-
terventions is likely to be less pronounced than what was observed for the
dynamic skill-complementarity model. To implement it, we reconstruct four
diﬀerent treatment groups using a version of the model where the parameters
{c1a, c2a, c3a,c4a} and {c1e, c2e, c3e,c4e} are set to 0.
9.3.1 The Education Subsidies
The estimates are found in the lower portion of Table 5. Again, the IV
estimate associated to the intermediate education subsidy (0.0630) is quite
accurate and quite precise (the standard error is 0.0069). It targets a LATE
parameter equal to 0.0645.
As observed before, the higher education subsidy generates a weak corre-
lation between schooling and the policy reform indicator (equal to 0.0095),
and this translates into a high degree of imprecision. The IV estimate is
equal to 0.0937, but he standard error, which is equal to 0.0829, is almost as
high as the IV estimate itself. Again, the high accuracy of the point estimate
is hardly interpretable giving the high degree of imprecision.
Again, we note the lower education subsidy generates a IV estimator
which is more precise than the higher education subsidy. However, it does
not recover the population treatment eﬀect. The IV estimate, equal to 0.0183,
misses the population parameter by 3 percentage points (0.0478). Its stan-
dard error, is equal to 0.0103.
9.3.2 Mandatory Schooling
The beneﬁt of using an instrument that generates a higher level of PIR
comes quite clearly again, upon examining the mandatory schooling IV esti-
mates. Those estimates, equal to -0.0044 and -0.0466, are very precise and
are both signiﬁcantly outside any reasonable conﬁdence interval, as they are
targeting LATE parameters equal to 0.0340 and 0.0379. As for the dynamic
skill complementarity model, we can compare the correlation between the
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control/treatment indicator and post schooling wage growth (3rd column of
Table 5), or compare the parameter estimates measuring the eﬀect of xΥi in
the treatment group (Table 6B) .
In either case, the diﬀerences between the incentive and the dictatorial
interventions come out clearly. The mandatory schooling instrument gener-
ate a stronger (negative) correlation between Z and ϕit(.). The correlations,
equal to -0.0231 and -0.0715, are more than a hundred times superior to the
correlations obtained for the subsidies. Equally, the eﬀects of xΥi in the treat-
ment groups measured for the compulsory schooling interventions, equal to
-0.0051 and -0.0207, are much stronger in relative terms than those obtained
from the intermediate and the higher education subsidies, which are equal to
0.00002 and -0.0002.34
9.4 Assuming Substitutability
As indicated earlier, in presence of substitutability diﬀerences in skills be-
tween those aﬀected and those unaﬀected, may be counterbalanced by the
eﬀects of diﬀerences in schooling . As a consequence, it is impossible to say if
PIR is beneﬁcial. All simulations and estimations performed in the current
version of the paper have also been carried under the skill substitutability
assumption. To do so, we just replaced the parameters generating skill com-
plementarity by their opposite. However, to save space and to simplify the
presentation, we do not report them. Basically, the results indicated no
marked diﬀerence in performance between incentive-based IV and compul-
sory schooling IV.
9.5 A Summary of the IV Results
To summarize, our results illustrate the beneﬁt of accessing an instrument
that generates a higher level of PIR, in a context where the error term of
the outcome equation is generated by wide classes of post-schooling discrete
choice models.
34For the sake of completeness, we have also investigated this possibility to control for
endogeneity of post-schooling experience, which may be deﬁned as the sum of employment
and training as work experience, using age and its square as instruments. Because we have
obtained results practically identical to those where only schooling is instrumented, and
in order to minimize the number of redundant tables, we do not report those estimates.
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Because of its relative degree of ﬂexibility, incentive-based policies (such
as education subsidies) may be capable of generating a suﬃcient degree of
randomization. This is not true for any incentive policy, but when it is, this
translates into a much higher capacity of incentive-based policies to generate
an instrument that fulﬁlls the identifying orthogonality condition. This is
what enables the econometrician to estimate a particular treatment eﬀect.
On the other hand, dictatorial policy interventions (such as compulsory
schooling regulations) that set a minimum consumption/investment level
cannot generate a reasonable degree of PIR, unless the minimum is set at an
unrealistic level, or unless the behavioral model displays no selection. For
this reason, a compulsory schooling regulation cannot realistically generate
an instrument that fulﬁlls the identifying orthogonality condition.
10 Some Interpretation
Obviously, we have chosen to interpret diﬀerences in IV from the perspective
of an econometrician who seeks to estimate a treatment eﬀect. Our results
may also be interpreted from a policy perspective. It is the negative esti-
mates, associated to the compulsory schooling reform, that are particular
interesting to analyze. When policy designers implement mandatory school-
ing, individual decisions are annihilated for a subset of the population. So,
those individuals who are endowed with low returns to academic skills (those
for whom the return to schooling is close to 0), are forced to delay their
post-schooling skill accumulation. At any date t, those individuals are facing
employment opportunities that take into account both their higher schooling
level, and their lower work experience (the sum of Ait and Eit). Consequently,
for those endowed with relatively high returns to work experience (in par-
ticular Eit), the policy may entail a reduction in lifetime earnings. This is
possible, even though the returns to skill accumulation are strictly positive
for every individual.
As such, these negative estimates are explained by the negative correlation
between wages, and policy intervention (what is usually called indirect least-
squares). For instance, suppose one uses total experience as the endogenous
variable (which may be regarded just as the mirror image of the schooling
variable in a simple binary choice framework), and applies standard IV. Then,
the IV estimate becomes positive, since a change is compulsory schooling
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reduces employment for a subset of the population. In our model, there are
as many IV estimates, as there are endogenous states. Obviously, some of
these may be positive, while others may be negative. This multiplicity of
signs (let alone the nominal values of the diﬀerent IV estimates) prevails
even if there is a single policy reform. Indeed, at a purely intuitive level, the
occurrence of a negative IV estimate, should normally raise suspicions about
the validity of the usual economic interpretation of IV, as some treatment
eﬀect parameter.
11 Implications for Empirical Work and Con-
cluding Remarks
At this stage, two questions naturally arise. First, what are the implications
of our results for the literature on the returns to schooling, or for empirical
work in general? Second, is the distinction between dictatorial and interven-
tions relevant in other contexts?
To answer the ﬁrst question, it is informative to refer to the IV liter-
ature on the returns to schooling. In this literature, it is common to rely
on static interpretations of the wage schooling relationship, and potential
mis-speciﬁcations are practically always ignored. In the earlier literature
surveyed in Card (1999), the conventional wisdom is that IV estimates of
the returns to education are high. Interestingly, the nature of the policy re-
form is never discussed, but the majority of IV estimates reported appear to
be obtained from various forms of mandatory schooling regulations. Indeed,
a thorough review of the IV estimates obtained from various compulsory
schooling reforms (including those published more recently) would reveal an
important dispersion in reported estimates. For instance, diﬀerent empirical
analyses of a same compulsory schooling reform, with the same data, may
lead to diﬀerences of the order of 10 percentage points.35 It is important to
understand that our claim is not that IV estimates of mandatory schooling
reform need to be as low as they are in our example. The point estimates
reported in the paper have no direct interest per-se. Our objective is solely to
35As an example, Deveraux and Hart (2008) report some IV estimates of a British com-
pulsory school reform that are close to 0, and mention other studies that report estimates
above 0.10 for the same policy intervention.
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investigate the relative performance of IV strategies that use diﬀerent policy
interventions. For instance, diﬀerent assumptions about the dynamic struc-
ture (a skill substitutability assumption, along with a diﬀerent correlation
structure) may well lead to estimates above the population LATE. Never-
theless, and as discussed in Cameron and Taber (2004), low estimates of
the returns to schooling tended not to get reported for a long time, but are
gradually being presented in the empirical IV literature. So, as IV estimates
that are close to 0 are now attracting more attention, it is not even clear
that negative IV estimates, such as those that are presented in the paper,
are unrealistic.
Our conjecture is that applied econometricians would be reluctant to
report IV speciﬁcations that result in negative estimates of the wage return
to schooling. Notwithstanding this, our conclusion is that IV estimates of the
returns to schooling reported in the literature, and which have been obtained
from mandatory schooling reforms, are probably those that should be more
subject to scrutiny. The reason is simple. Dictatorial policy interventions are
ill-equipped to break the curse of selectivity in the sub-population aﬀected.
Dictatorial policies always directly (or indirectly) target a more selective
sub-population.
With respect to the second question, although we cannot bring a formal
analysis, our answer is yes. Within the education literature, a increasingly
large number of economists are investigating the eﬀects of raising parents’
education, on children’s education. While this sort of question may be an-
swered within a dynamic (intergenerational) skill accumulation, it is also
customary to estimate this eﬀect using IV techniques, and to rely on manda-
tory schooling reforms. Clearly, the impact of raising education of a minority
of low skill individuals through some compulsory regulation may diﬀer sub-
stantially from the impact of raising the average level of education of a more
representative population.
The literature on estimating the returns to work experience is another
area where our analysis may be relevant. Incentive policies (such as tax
reform) stimulating the decision to work and dictatorial policies that reduce
work experience for a subset of the population (such as military/civil service
reforms) are likely to give rise to the same issues discussed in this paper.36
We can also ﬁnd illustrations outside the educational context. In any
36See Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995), for an analysis of Dutch conscription.
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model where completed fertility is a key determinant of some individual
choice (labor supply) or some outcome (earnings), the distinction between
dictatorial and incentive-based interventions may be relevant. As is the case
for schooling, fertility has been the subject of various policies aimed at stim-
ulating (or reducing) it. While many countries have adopted incentive pro-
visions to raise family size (Sweden, France, Canada, to mention a few),
China has adopted a more restrictive policy37. Empirical economists may be
tempted to use some of these policy reforms in the context of IV estimation.
However, our conjecture is that the issues we raised in this paper would also
be relevant in the fertility case, as well as many other cases.
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Table 1A
Life Cycle Choices in the Control Group:
Dynamic Skill Complementarity Model
Accumulated number of periods in each State
In School Employment Employment Home
(learning by doing) (Training) Production
year
1 0.789 0.146 0.001 0.063
2 1.526 0.289 0.021 0.164
3 2.224 0.449 0.057 0.270
4 2.872 0.633 0.118 0.377
5 3.444 0.849 0.218 0.489
6 3.946 1.096 0.354 0.605
7 4.384 1.358 0.533 0.724
8 4.758 1.632 0.767 0.843
9 5.044 1.911 1.083 0.962
10 5.260 2.192 1.466 1.082
15 5.587 3.750 3.982 1.682
20 5.613 6.739 5.371 2.276
25 5.614 11.125 5.398 2.864
30 5.614 15.530 5.398 3.458
33 5.614 18.173 5.398 3.815
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Table 1B
Life Cycle Choices in the Control Group:
Static Model
Accumulated number of periods in each State
In School Employment Employment Home
(learning by doing) (Training) Production
year
1 0.586 0.271 0.006 0.136
2 1.123 0.526 0.046 0.305
3 1.622 0.791 0.105 0.482
4 2.080 1.067 0.192 0.661
5 2.464 1.347 0.330 0.860
6 2.788 1.650 0.491 1.072
7 3.063 1.959 0.682 1.296
8 3.298 2.279 0.901 1.521
9 3.488 2.607 1.159 1.747
10 3.643 2.940 1.443 1.974
15 3.950 4.772 1.761 3.113
20 3.993 7.547 4.192 4.268
25 3.995 11.334 4.218 5.453
30 3.995 15.101 4.218 6.686
33 3.995 17.338 4.218 7.448
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Table 1C
The Distribution of Schooling in the Control Groups
Model
Dynamic/Skill-comp. Static
Years of Schooling Percentage Percentage
0 15.19 32.71
1 4.39 7.52
2 3.42 3.18
3 3.91 2.29
4 16.44 18.25
5 5.74 4.16
6 5.52 3.75
7 6.63 4.21
8 21.1 11.56
9 5.9 3.26
10-more 11.7 9.11
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Table 2A
The determinants of Schooling, Employment and Training in the
Control Group:
Dynamic Skill Complementarity Model
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variables Schooling (S) Employment (E) Training (A)
Estimate Estimate Estimate
(st. error) (st. error) (st. error)
Heterogeneity
Components
intercept 6.3637 -0.5075 -7.1614
(0.0063) (0.0807) (0.0590)
academic ability 0.4178 0.2873 0.7126
(0.0122) (0.0236) (0.0159)
return to training/educ. 2.3503 -1.0235 0.0036
(0.0122) (0.0337) (0.0226)
return to Emp. (learning) 0.1759 2.5546 -0.8639
(0.0064) (0.0130) (0.0087)
home time 0.0325 0.2443 -0.4294
(0.0063) (0.0213) (0.0087)
Discount factor 1.4943 -0.0747 —0.3372
(0.0063) (0.0213) (0.0143)
Schooling - -0.1358 0.8952
(0.0106) (0.0071)
age 0.4736 0.7387
(0.0078) (0.0052)
age2 0.0058 -0.0167
(0.0002) (0.0001)
R square 0.80 0.84 0.83
# of observations 50,000 50,000 50,000
Note: The regression is performed on 50000 individuals observations on
completed schooling. All individual endowments are standardized.
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Table 2B
The determinants of Schooling, Employment and Training in the
Control Group: Static Model
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variables Schooling (S) Employment (E) Training (A)
Estimate Estimate Estimate
(st. error) (st. error) (st. error)
Heterogeneity
Components
intercept 4.7947 -0.0729 -5.1195
(0.0059) (0.0632) (0.0384)
academic ability 0.2571 1.1823 0.3491
(0.0117) (0.0242) (0.0147)
return to training/educ. 3.4312 -0.2964 1.4642
(0.0116) (0.0412) (0.0250)
return to learning 0.0059 3.2320 -0.3598
(0.0061) (0.0126) (0.0076)
home time -0.0128 0.0581 -0.4246
(0.0060) (0.0125) (0.0076)
Discount factor 0.9144 0.6060 -0.4515
(0.0061) (0.0154) (0.0093)
Schooling - -
age - 0.6021 0.6663
(0.0064) (0.0039)
age2 - 0.0006 -0.0145
(0.0002) (0.0001)
R square 0.86 0.85 0.81
# of observations 50,000 50,000 50,000
Note: The regression is performed on 50000 individuals observations on
completed schooling. All individual endowments are standardized.
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Table 3
Characteristics of the Sub-population Affected by all Policy
Interventions
% aﬀected Returns Education
educ. learning (ex-ante)
Model/Intervention
Dynamic Skill-Comp
lower educ. subsidy 26.2 0.0369 0.0075 3.79
intermed. educ. subsidy 24.4 0.0717 0.0086 7.93
Higher educ. subsidy 9.1 0.0809 0.0127 8.38
2-year mandatory 25.8 0.0303 0.0045 1.11
4-year mandatory 34.6 0.0376 0.0061 2.89
Static
lower educ. subsidy 23.0 0.0478 0.0189 2.74
intermed. educ. subsidy 21.4 0.0787 0.0108 5.78
Higher educ. subsidy 5.8 0.0925 0.0112 8.04
2-year mandatory 45.9 0.0340 0.0170 1.65
4-year mandatory 52.2 0.0379 0.0189 2.07
Note: The Education variable measures ex-ante schooling (pre-intervention
schooling)
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Table 4A
The Effects of Skills and Preferences on Individual Counterfactual
Reactions
Data Generating Process: Dynamic Model
Educ. Subsidy Mandatory schooling
Lower Intermed. higher 2 years 4 years
Dependent Variable Ri(.) Ri(.) Ri(.) Ri(.) Ri(.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Skills/Preferences
intercept 0.4985 0.3473 0.1075 0.5346 0.9373
(0.0094) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0042)
academic ability -0.2494 0.2156 -0.0480 -0.2557 -0.4192
(0.0054) (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0045) (0.0082)
return to educ. -0.4016 -0.0515 0.1125 -0.3280 -0.5255
(0 .0094) (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0045) (0.0081)
return to Emp. -0.1794 -0.0859 0.0130 -0.2706 -0.3664
(0 .0051) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0043)
home time -0.0423 -0.0891 -0.0082 -0.0147 -0.0037
(0.0051) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0042)
Discount factor -0.3313 -0.0539 0.0432 -0.2911 -0.6072
(0 .0052) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0043)
R square 0.3201 0.0715 0.0612 0.4725 0.6038
Note: The dependent variable (Ri(.) ) is measured as the diﬀerence be-
tween the individual optimal schooling under a speciﬁc policy intervention
and the individual optimal schooling in absence of any intervention (control
group). The regressions are computed using 50,000 counterfactual reactions.
All individual endowments are standardized.
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Table 4B
The Effects of Skills and Preferences on Individual Counterfactual
Reactions
Data Generating Process: Static Model
Educ. Subsidy Mandatory Schooling
Lower Intermed. higher 2 years 4 years
Dependent Variable Ri(.) Ri(.) Ri(.) Ri(.) Ri(.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Endowments
intercept 0.4716 0.3843 0.0600 0.8980 1.6363
(0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0047)
academic ability -0.0046 0.2688 -0.0515 -0.2085 -0.4643
(0.0115) (0.0072) (0.0023) (0.0066) (0.0091)
return to educ. -0.3216 -0.0457 0.1052 -0.5617 -1.1171
(0.0114) (0.0071) (0.0033) (0.0065) (0.0091)
return to Emp. 0.3205 0.0074 -0.0016 -0.0317 0.0098
(0.0066) (0.0038) (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0047)
home time 0.1243 -0.1848 0.0105 0.1036 0.2071
(0.0066) (0.0037) (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0047)
Discount factor -0.0831 -0.0031 0.0092 -0.1875 -0.4652
(0.0122) (0.0037) (0.0012) (0.0033) (0.0047)
R square 0.20 0.11 0.06 0.51 0.70
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Table 4C
Summary Measures of the degree of Post-Intervention
Randomization
by Intervention and Model
Regression
Individual reactions Individual reactions
on skills on ex-ante education
(R2) (marg. eﬀect of educ)
Interventions Model
Subsidy: Basic
Dynamic 0.32 -0.0768∗
Static 0.20 -0.0529∗
Subsidy: Intermediate
Dynamic 0.07 0.0183∗
Static 0.11 0.0283∗
Subsidy: Higher
Dynamic 0.06 0.0223∗
Static 0.06 0.0194∗
Two-year mandatory
Dynamic 0.47 -0.0871∗
Static 0.51 -0.1072∗
Four-year mandatory
Dynamic 0.6038 -0.1019∗
Static -0.1096∗
Note: All marginal eﬀects with a “∗” are signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level.
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Table 5
IV Estimates of the Returns to Schooling
λˆiV LATE Correlations
(st.error) Educ (Zi, ϕit(.) (Zi, S)
Model/Intervention
Dynamic
lower educ subsidy -0.0894 (0.0188) 0.0369 -0.0338 0.0512
intermed. educ. subsidy 0.0715 (0.0099) 0.0717 0.0019 0.0641
Higher educ. subsidy 0.0846 (0.0333) 0.0809 -0.0008 0.0183
2-year mandatory -0.1198 (0.0242) 0.0303 -0.0295 0.0375
4-year mandatory -0.0846 (0.0094) 0.0376 -0.0485 0.0906
Static
lower educ. subsidy 0.0183 (0.0103) 0.0478 -0.0184 0.0645
intermed. educ. subsidy 0.0630 (0.0069) 0.0645 -0.0048 0.0645
Higher educ. subsidy 0.0937 (0.0829) 0.0925 -0.0004 0.0095
2-year mandatory 0.0044 (0.0074) 0.0340 -0.0231 0.0996
4-year mandatory -0.0466 (0.0046) 0.0379 -0.0715 0.1854
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Table 6A
Analysis of post-schooling Skill Accumulation of the Treatment
Group
Data Generating Process: Dynamic Model
Educ Subsidy Mandatory Schooling
Lower Intermed. higher 2 years 4 years
intercept -0.0565 -0.0634 -0.0325 -0.0264 -0.0418
(0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0043) (0.0048)
xΥi -0.0142 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0108 -0.0162
(0.0019) (0.001) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Schooling 0.0054 0.0194 0.0231 0.0006 -0.0079
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Schooling2 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0011 0.0008 0.0014
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
age 0.0066 0.0073 0.0070 0.0063 0.0057
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
age2 -0.00007 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00001) (0.0000) (0.00000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Note: The variable xΥi is equal to 1 when individual i is aﬀected by the
policy (ri(Υ) > 0) and 0 if not (ri(Υ) = 0)
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Table 6B
Analysis of post-schooling Skill Accumulation of the Treatment
Group
Data Generating Process: Static Model
Educ Subsidy Mandatory Schooling
Lower Intermed. higher 2 years 4 years
intercept -0.0001 0.0170 0.0194 0.0089 0.0059
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0033)
xΥi -0.0053 0.00002 -0.0002 -0.0091 -0.0207
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Schooling - - - - -
Schooling2 - - - - -
age 0.0104 0.0074 0.0070 0.0087 0.0099
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
age2 -0.0001 -0.00005 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Note: The variable xΥi is equal to 1 when individual i is aﬀected by the
policy (ri(Υ) > 0) and 0 if not (ri(Υ) = 0)
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Appendix
Table A1
The Heterogeneity Distribution
αS αH αW λ θ δ ca0
1
1+r
type
1 -0.1575 2.59 0.010 0.0000 0.0050 5.4851 0.97
2 0.0425 3.01 0.029 0.0246 0.0145 5.3771 0.99
3 0.6425 2.56 0.081 0.0000 0.0405 5.0531 0.91
4 0.4425 2.66 0.051 0.0066 0.0255 5.1611 0.97
5 -0.2575 2.81 0.027 0.000 0.0135 5.5391 0.95
6 0.3425 2.71 0.039 0.0366 0.0195 5.2150 0.92
7 -0.0575 2.91 0.033 0.0126 0.0165 5.4310 0.90
8 -0.1575 2.85 0.025 0.0056 0.0125 5.4851 0.96
9 0.1425 2.87 0.045 0.0306 0.0225 5.3231 0.93
10 1.1925 2.76 0.057 0.0186 0.0285 4.7561 0.98
11 -0.3575 2.91 0.020 0.0000 0.0100 5.5931 0.91
12 0.3425 3.01 0.043 0.0016 0.0215 5.2150 0.99
13 0.2425 2.61 0.075 0.0196 0.0375 5.2691 0.96
14 0.2425 2.61 0.069 0.0136 0.0345 5.2691 0.99
15 0.9425 2.85 0.087 0.0166 0.0435 4.8910 0.95
16 0.7425 2.87 0.093 0.0076 0.0465 4.9991 0.94
17 1.5425 2.81 0.079 0.0006 0.0395 4.5671 0.90
18 1.7425 2.76 0.118 0.0076 0.0590 4.4591 0.92
19 1.2425 2.63 0.112 0.0136 0.0560 4.7291 0.98
20 1.1425 3.21 0.107 0.0106 0.0535 4.7831 0.95
Mean 0.50 2.80 0.06 0.01 0.03 5.13 0.95
St Dev. 0.62 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.03
Note: Each type has a population proportion equal to 0.05.
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Table A2
The correlation between the heterogeneity component
cost of value wage return retutn to return to cost of Discount
schooling home intercept schooling experience training training Factor
αS αH αW β θ δ ca0
1
1+r
αS 1.00 -0.009 0.857 0.111 0.857 -1.00 -0.106
αH 1.00 -0.043 0.087 -0.043 0.009 -0.046
β 1.00 0.110 1.00 -0.857 -0.076
θ 1.00 0.110 -0.111 0.112
δ 1.00 -0.857 -0.076
ca0 1.00 0.106
1
1+r
1.00
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Table A3
OLS regressions on Simulated Wages in the Control Group:
Dynamic Skill Complementarity Model
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(st. errors) (st. errors) (st. errors) (st. errors)
education 0.1213 0.1333 0.0964 0.1299
(.0007 ) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0008)
experience - 0.0167 0.0050 0.0448
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0012)
educ*experience 0.0020
(0.0001)
experience2 - - - -0.0008
(0.0001)
R2 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.37
Note: The regressions are computed on a cross section of wages generated
from simulated individual choices. The cross section contains 50,000 obser-
vations (20 types multiplied by 2500 diﬀerent realizations of the full vector
of random shocks).Experience is deﬁned as the sum of the number of years
in employment/learning by doing, and employment/training.
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Table A4
OLS regressions on Simulated Wages in the Control Group:
Static Model
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(st. errors) (st. errors) (st. errors) (st. errors)
education 0.1232 0.1355 0.1045 0.1343
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0007)
experience 0.0155 0.0078 0.0420
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0012)
educ*experience 0.0017 -
(0.0001)
experience2 -0.0007
(0.00003)
R2 0.3698 0.4022 0.4066 0.4079
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